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A survey on the Economic Impact 
of the Development of Private labels1 
 
Introduction  
 
What is a private label (hereafter PL)? The PLMA (Private Label Manufacturers’ Association) defines 
a PL as follows: “PL products encompass all merchandise sold under a retailer’s brand. That brand can 
be the retailer’s own name or a name created exclusively by that retailer. In some cases, a retailer may 
belong to a wholesale group that owns the brands that are available only to the members of the 
group.’’2 According to Nielsen, PLs are brands that belong to a retailer or a grocery firm and that are 
distributed exclusively by that retailer. The French law (2001 May 15th) that deals with new economic 
regulations provides the following definition: a PL “is considered to be a product sold within a retailer 
brand, whose characteristics are defined by the firm (or the group of firms) that sells the product and is 
the owner of the brand”.  
These definitions bring out two main ideas. First, it is the retailer who owns and controls the 
brand whereas this was traditionally the role of the producer. Second, the retailer has exclusive rights 
to the product. This means that different retailers do not sell identical PLs, which is not the case when 
retailers sell name-brands. Thus the development of PLs does not only change the relations between 
producers and retailers (because of the retailer’s new role), but also affects competition between 
retailers, because PLs are an additional way of differentiating between retailers.  
Different approaches to the economics of PL are possible. One is the analysis of retailers without 
taking upstream firms and their relationships with retailers into account. With this approach, the 
reports published in the literature about oligopoly or about the optimal choice of a range of products 
by oligopolists apply. How firms choose their optimal range of products is influenced by two opposite 
effects (Champsaur and Rochet, 1989). On the one hand, the range of products needs to be as wide as 
possible in order to discriminate among consumers. On the other hand, each firm’s products need to be 
differentiated in order to reduce the impact of price competition. Gilbert and Matutes (1993), assuming 
differentiation between products is due to brands’ name, showed that two firms will compete on a 
wide range of products because the differentiation due to the brand name weakens competition 
between products.  
Nevertheless, the former analysis fails to reveal the stakes related to procurement as well as to 
surplus distribution on a vertical structure. A number of reports are devoted to the analysis of vertical 
relationships and specially the impact of contracts and vertical restraints between producers and 
retailers. According to these authors, the brand is almost always defined by the upstream producer and 
there is equivalence between the brand and the upstream manufacturer. Moreover these studies 
generally focus on the vertical structure made up of a producer and his retailer(s), and deal with, first, 
coordination within the structure and, second, the competition between vertical structures (for a 
survey, see Rey, 1997). Coordination problems in a vertical structure mainly concern price setting, 
optimal level of services and risk sharing. The authors generally showed that vertical restraints allow 
better coordination within the vertical structure. Consumers generally benefit from these vertical 
restraints but this depends on the intensity of competition downstream. The more intense the 
competition downstream, the more likely it is that consumers will benefit from restraints. The second 
point dealt with in the studies is the impact of vertical restraints on competition between vertical 
structures. As in the first case, the impact of vertical restraints is ambiguous when competition 
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2 PLMA, see www.plmainternational.com. 
between vertical structures is weak. In this case, restraints may have a strongly negative impact on 
consumers that is not fully compensated for by the positive impact on the vertical structures 
themselves. 
As emphasised by Comanor and Rey (2000), published reports mainly deal with the case of 
one producer and several retailers. The case of large retailers who wish to profit from their position in 
order to deter the entry of new retailers has been analysed less frequently. Moreover, as Rey pointed 
out with reference to these reports (Rey, 1997), as vertical restraints on the brand are generally 
designed by the upstream producer there is a limit to the use of their results in the economic analysis 
of PLs. 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to survey the recent literature devoted to the economic impact 
of the development of PLs. Dobson (1998) has analysed the economic welfare implication of PLs and 
discussed conditions under which their development is likely to affect positively or negatively welfare. 
Since 1998, numerous empirical and theoretical papers have been published. This article offers a 
survey of these recent contributions. It is worth noting that this literature is part of a growing one 
related to the analysis of retailer power: that is the buying power as well as the selling power of 
retailers. Yet, concentration of the retail sector is increasing in numerous countries and a lot of 
competition cases now concern the retailing activities.   
 
 In the first section of this paper we provide some statistics about the development of private 
labels for different products in different countries. Using the results from econometric studies, we also 
analyse the empirical factors that favour the development of private labels. In the second section, we 
discuss the reasons retailers introduce private labels i.e. to increase their bargaining power, and to 
discriminate demand. In the third section we deal with the empirical consequences of the development 
of private labels on producers and retailers. In the fourth section we review questions that are less 
frequently discussed. Finally in section five we draw some conclusions about the impact of the 
development of PLs on welfare.  
1. Market share of private labels and factors that favour the 
introduction and the penetration of private labels 
 
1.1  Background 
 
In Europe the penetration of PLs varies from country to country. However, in all countries the market 
share in volume is higher than the market share in value. Thus, these products are generally sold at a 
lower price than the average price. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare the situation in different 
European countries because the definition of a PL varies. In particular, it is important to know if 
discount products are included or not.3  
 
Table 1: Market share of private labels in some OECD countries. Year 2001 (%). 
Country Volume (1) Value (2) (1) / (2) 
Italy 12.8 11.1 115 
United States* 20.0 15.5 129 
The Netherlands 20.7 18.6 111 
Spain 23.6 17.0 138 
France 24.3 20.8 116 
Germany 31.0 24.0 129 
Belgium 36.4 26.9 135 
United-Kingdom 41.0 39.0 105 
* US Data are for the year 2000    Source: PLMA / AC Nielsen 2002 
 
As illustrated in the graph below, the more concentrated the retail sector, the bigger the market 
share of private labels. 
 
Figure 1: Private Label penetration rate and retail concentration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Within a given country, the PL market share varies with the product category and, within a 
given category, the PL market share varies with the product. Different factors can influence the 
penetration of PLs. Some are related to the supply (structure of supply, ease of entry, innovation 
policy, etc) and others to the characteristics of demand. For example, the goods that require a high 
                                                 
3 By discount products, we refer to products sold at very low price, generally in specific retail outlets. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Market Share of Private Labels (%)
C
5 
(%
)
Belgium
Spain
France
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Germany
level of consumer confidence (baby food, health and beauty products, etc.) generally exhibit low rates 
of PL penetration. (Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Table 2: Market share of private labels per category of products in European countries. Year 2002 (%).  
Country Frozen Food Confectionery Non-alcoholic beverages Health and Beauty 
 Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume 
Italy 17.3 21.0 - - 9.8 11.5 1.8 2.8 
The Netherlands 20.2 25.7 13.8 14.2 11.2 11.9 3.6 6.3 
Spain 33.9 46.3 11.4 16.3 10.1 18.1 7.6 14.8 
France 36.3 40.9 12.2 14.0 16.0 19.8 5.9 9.9 
Germany* 36.0 46.4 25.0 28.3 20.0 23.1 6.8 14.7 
Belgium 49.0 59.8 17.9 25.7 26.3 39.8 8.9 20.8 
United Kingdom 45.4 46.3 18.8 18.8 35.9 47.1 17.9 24.4 
* Excluding Aldi which sells almost exclusively private labels. Including Aldi, the market share of private labels 
would be greater by 10 points. 
Source: PLMA / AC Nielsen 2002 
 
 As shown in Table 3, penetration of PLs has increased in recent years in almost all categories. 
 
Table 3: Penetration of PLs by product category in France (%) 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 2000/1997 
Groceries 21.8 21.1 19.,9 18.7 117 
Drinks 19.9 19.1 18.9 18.,6 107 
Cleaning products 24.8 22.,9 20.7 20.0 124 
Health and beauty products 7.3 7.1 6.6 5.9 124 
Frozen products 33.8 31.7 29.7 29.0 117 
Tobacco products 32.9 33.3 28.9 28.6 115 
Dairy products 26.4 26.1 25.7 24.2 109 
Cheese  21.5 20.0 19.4 18.8 114 
Cooked pork meats 37.7 35.2 32.5 24.2 156 
Delicatessen  26.4 23.1 19.2 17.2 153 
Source: Linéaires (www.lineaires.com). 
 
As discussed before, private label penetration depends on the country as well as the product 
category. It also depends on the retailer as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Market share of private labels by retailers’ groups in France (according to Secodip, 2001) 
Retailer’s 
name 
Private Label Market Share  
in volume (%) 
Intermarché 31.3 
Carrefour 24.6 
Champion 23.1 
Système U 22.2 
Leclerc 20.7 
Casino 27.4 
Géant 19.3  
Cora 18.6 
Match 18.2 
Monoprix / Prisunic  17.1 
Auchan 18.5 
Atac 16.1 
Source: Secodip from retailers, 2001 
 
According to PLMA, manufacturers of PL products can be classified in three general categories: 
- Large-scale manufacturers who produce both their own brands and PL products; 
- Medium and small manufacturers who specialise in particular product lines and concentrate 
almost exclusively on producing PLs; 
- Major retailers and wholesalers who operate their own manufacturing plants and provide PL 
products for their own stores. 
 
In the French dairy sector for example, examples can be found in each of the above categories. 
Thus almost all large dairy firms produce both their own brands and PLs (Besnier, Bongrain, Nestlé, 
SODIAAL, Entremont). Medium and small manufacturers have been specialising (at least for some 
years), in PL production (for example, Senoble, which began with PL production, has now developed 
its own brand). Finally at least one retailer has its own production line for dairy products (Intermarché 
owns a production unit in St Père, France).  
1.2 Factors that favour the introduction and the development of private 
labels 
 
We have shown that PL penetration varies across products as well as across retailers. Several 
researchers have tried to explain why this is the case. Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995) showed that 
the introduction of PLs is more likely when the product market consists of a large number of national 
brands (hereafter NB).4 They also found a positive impact (on the probability of the introduction of 
PLs) on the amount of sales in the category. In a recent study, Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2000) 
showed that the introduction of PLs is more likely when the leading NB has a large market share. 
Their results confirm the positive impact of the total value of category sales. Moreover, their results 
suggest that the advertising / total sales ratio has a positive impact on the probability of the 
introduction of private labels. Finally, they found that a large number of producers also favour the 
introduction of PLs. However, since they controlled for the market share of the leader, this may be the 
consequence of a greater ability on the part of the retailer to find a firm able to produce his PL. 
In a study on the market share of PLs in the U.S. for 34 categories of products in 106 different 
locations, Dhar and Hoch (1997) showed that 40% of the variance of their sample (variance of the 
market share of PLs across products, retailers and locations) was explained by differences across 
categories of products and  that 17% of variance originated from retailers. 
This study (Dhar and Hoch, 1997, p. 211), showed the main factors that favour a large market 
share for private labels were the following: 
· High quality relative to the NB; 
· Low variability of quality of PLs; 
· High product category sales (this finding is not confirmed by other studies; Raju et al. (1995) 
did not find a significant impact of this variable on the market share of  PLs); 
· High gross margins (in %); 
· A small number of national manufacturers operating in the category (this result is the same as 
that of Raju et al. (1995), who showed that the market share of a PL increases when the 
number of NB decreases5); 
· Low national advertising expenditures. 
 
The six above factors explained 70% of the variance of the market share of PLs in a sample of 185 
products. The main factors that influence the market share of PLs sold by a given retailer are the 
following: 
                                                 
4 By National Brands we refer to brands that are designed by and belong to upstream manufacturers and that are 
distributed at a national scale. 
5 Thus, according to the results of Raju et al. (1995), the factors that favour the probability of the introduction of 
a private label and those that favour their development are not identical.  
- The number of NBs actually sold by the retailer has a negative impact. The lower the number 
of NBs, the larger the market share of the PLs. This could be due to the competition between 
products in a context of fixed retail capacity. The larger the number of products (on a specific 
market), the lower the market share of each ‘variety’. 
- The heterogeneity of the market share of NBs (for each retailer) has a positive impact. This 
could be due to prices. A heterogeneous market share among NBs could be linked to higher 
prices which would facilitate the penetration of PLs. 
- Promotions on PLs and the differences in price between PLs and NBs have a positive impact. 
Conversely, promotions on NBs have a negative impact even if the impact is lower than that 
of promotions on PLs. 
- Overall strategy of retailers (for example: commitment to quality, use of own name for a PL, a 
premium brand offering) has a positive impact. 
- Wealthier consumers buy fewer PLs.  
 
Finally, according to a survey by LSA/Fournier, the main reasons retailers develop PLs are to 
increase customer loyalty (16%), to improve their positioning (18%), to improve margins (25%), and 
to lower prices (33%). These motives are related to two main economic effects i.e. competition 
between retailers and vertical coordination between producers and retailers. 
In the first case, PLs are viewed as an additional way of enabling  consumers to differentiate 
between retailers. Since PLs are specific to each retailer, the supply of products will no longer be 
identical., In the food sector, where exclusive sales agreements are infrequent, in the absence of PLs, 
retailers often sell the same products. From this point of view, retailers are consequently not 
differentiated (although  they are obviously differentiated for other reasons such as location, services, 
etc). As PLs are specific to each retailer, their introduction thus enhances differentiation between 
retailers. And finally, this is also a way to lessen price competition.  
In the second case, by introducing a PL, a retailer becomes a competitor of his supplier. Thus, the 
retailer reinforces his bargaining position with regard to his supplier. 
These two elements are not independent because the level of competition in the final market strongly 
influences profit sharing within vertical structures. According to Steiner (1985), the relative power 
between producers and retailers is directly linked to the loyalty of consumers for brands or stores: ‘If 
consumers are more disposed to switch brands within store than stores within brand, retailers dominate 
manufacturers. Retail margins will be relatively high and those of manufacturers relatively low. When 
consumers are more disposed to switch stores within brand than brands within store, the above market 
power and margin are reversed.’ (Steiner, 1985, p. 157-158). Consequently the development of a label 
that incites consumers not to change stores to find their ‘preferred’ product elsewhere can reinforce the 
bargaining power of retailers.  
2. Why should retailers sell private labels? 
 
Even if the intensity of downstream competition is not independent of upstream bargaining power, the 
majority of economic studies have mainly focused on bargaining power with regard to upstream firms. 
 
2.1. Private Labels increase retailers’ bargaining power 
 
Many of the theoretical models that analyse the development of PLs have mainly focused on the 
impact of PLs in a vertical structure. Generally speaking, PL products are a tool for retailers to 
discriminate demand (by supplying a new product) and to enhance their share of profits on the vertical 
structure. We will see that these two are opposing forces and that the resulting choice of PL 
characteristics is a compromise between these two objectives. 
 
The usual framework is a vertical structure composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, both 
being in a position of monopoly. The manufacturer makes a high-quality good at a constant marginal 
cost. He sells this good to the retailer at a wholesale price w (we assume linear tariff contracts for the 
moment)., Excluding distribution costs (in order to keep the analysis simple) the retailer sells this good 
to consumers at a price p.6 Within this framework, the consumer price results from a double -
marginalization process. Indeed, every firm prices above its marginal cost in order to benefit from its 
market power. This situation, though profitable for each firm, is detrimental for the social welfare. If 
the retailer supplies a new product that competes with an existing one, the retailer’s profit can increase 
to the detriment of the manufacturer’s and this can lead to a reduction in the double -marginalization 
effect. The competition due to the new sold good limits the market power of the manufacturer, who 
consequently lowers his wholesale price and this leads to a decrease in the double-marginalization. 
Unless the supply cost of the PL is too high, the consumer’s surplus rises due to the decrease in 
double-marginalization.   
 
In the economic reports on private labels, the new good introduced by the retailer is assumed 
to be of lower quality than the existing one. This is mostly true as it seems that consumers generally 
perceive private labels as being of lower quality, or at least no higher than the manufacturers’ brands.7 
In a survey carried out for INSEE (French National Statistical Institute). Chardon and Dumartin 
(1998) show that consumers who frequently buy PLs consider the quality-price ratio as being the main 
advantage of these products. 
Reports in the literature also assume that the PL is bought by the retailer at its marginal 
production cost. This may be the case when the PL is produced by a competitive fringe composed of 
small firms, which is quite frequent in the food industry due to the relative absence of barriers to entry. 
It may also be the case when the production firm is vertically integrated with the retailer and the 
internal wholesale price is thus the marginal cost. 
Assuming this to be the case, an upstream manufacturer proposes a wholesale price for a NB. The 
retailer can then choose whether he will sell the NB or not, as well as whether he will sell the PL or 
not. Finally, the retailer sets the consumers’ price(s) for the NB and/or the PL. The manufacturer can 
react in three ways with respect to the wholesale price of the NB: 
- Propose a monopoly wholesale  price, just as if there were no PL; 
- Propose a wholesale price sufficiently low in order to deter the retailer from introducing the 
PL; 
- Propose a wholesale price taking into account the presence of the PL (the manufacturer 
accommodates the entry). 
 
Two opposite hypotheses relative to PL production cost have been reported in the literature. They 
do not lead to exactly the same conclusions. Mills (1995) analysed the case where the production 
variable costs for the PL and the NB are the same. The production costs of the two goods only differ in 
the fixed costs. This can be interpreted as advertising expenses: NBs are (subjectively) considered by 
consumers as high-quality goods because they are extensively advertised. Advertising expenses are 
independent of volume sales and can therefore be considered as fixed costs. Conversely, the objective 
characteristics of the two goods are identical, but the qualities perceived by consumers are not: this is 
usually referred as subjective quality. 
Based on such assumptions, Mills showed that: 
- If PL quality is too low (relative to the quality of the NB), the retailer does not introduce the 
PL because it is considered as a too low quality substitute for the NB product. The NB 
manufacturer remains in a position of monopoly and sets the wholesale price to the same 
level as the monopoly wholesale price. 
- When the PL quality is above a certain threshold, the retailer facing a monopoly wholesale 
price might introduce his PL. The NB manufacturer then has an incentive to lower his 
wholesale price in order to deter the retailer from selling his PL. The manufacturer thus sets a 
                                                 
6 Results are still valid when assuming that the retailer faces a distribution cost. 
7 This may now be less pronounced thanks to the introduction of “High-quality” private labels such as Reflets de 
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limit wholesale price.The threat of a PL consequently leads to a decrease in the NB wholesale 
price.  The higher the quality of the PL with respect to the NB, the greater the decrease 
- Finally, above a specific quality threshold, PL quality is too high for the NB manufacturer to 
deter its introduction. The NB manufacturer consequently finds it profitable to set a 
wholesale price that accommodates the entry of the PL. Both products are thus sold on the 
market. The higher the quality of the PL, the lower the NB wholesale price. When the 
perceived qualities are identical, the NB wholesale price is set to marginal cost and the 
upstream manufacturer makes zero profit.8 
 
The most important result is that the threat of a PL entry or its actual introduction leads to a 
decrease in the NB wholesale price. This decrease increases with an increase in PL quality. The 
vertical structure’s profits increase (due to the decrease in the double-marginalization effect) and the 
retailer’s profits increase more than the manufacturer’s profit decreases.9 Consumers also benefit from 
the supply of the PL (or from the threat of supplying a PL) since the final price of the NB decreases 
and market coverage increases. 
Taking into account fixed costs does not allow any systematic conclusions to be drawn about the 
benefit to social welfare of the introduction of a PL. However, as long as the fixed costs are low, social 
welfare is improved by the sale of a PL. 
Contrary to Mills (1995) who assumed that marginal costs were identical for both products, 
Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999) supposed that PL and NB differ in their marginal production 
costs. In their model, the marginal production cost increases with quality. The mechanisms at play 
remain the same (double marginalization), but the results are different. 
Indeed, if the PL possesses a cost-disadvantage (at identical quality, manufacturing the PL is 
more costly than the NB), thus: 
- If the PL quality is low, the NB manufacturer cannot impede the entry of the competing 
product at a low cost. The retailer therefore sells both products. The price of the NB first 
decreases as a reaction to PL quality, then, under some conditions, it can increase. Indeed, the 
higher the PL quality, the more competitive the PL is with respect to the NB. This leads to a 
decrease in the NB wholesale price. However, the increase in PL quality induces a cost 
increase which goes in the opposite direction. The resulting summed effect can be an increase 
in the price of the NB. In this case, it should be noted that the NB will disappear from the 
store if the cost of the PL is low enough and when the consumers’ willingness to pay for 
quality is low (the NB quality was too high). 
- For intermediate values of PL quality, the NB manufacturer sets a limit wholesale price and 
deters sales of the PL. In this case, the NB price increases with PL quality. The increasing 
cost of the PL makes the limit price strategy easier.  
- Above a certain quality threshold, the NB recovers its natural monopoly position because the 
PL is not competitive. The NB manufacturer fixes a monopoly price and the retailer only sells 
the NB in his store. 
 
When the NB has no cost-advantage (this means at the same quality, the cost of the PL is the 
same as that of the NB), the PL is always introduced and the NB final price decreases as a function of 
PL quality. The actual introduction of a PL (or the threat of introduction) improves social welfare 
because it lessens or avoids the double -marginalization problem. 
This model, which also relies on the assumption of linear tariffs between the manufacturer and 
the retailer, emphasizes the importance of the role played by the cost structure of the production 
process in the decision to introduce a PL introduction. One conclusion is however that the 
development of PLs is beneficial for social welfare. 
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the product market and the NB is not lis ted any longer (see Allain and Flochel, 2001). 
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The two models presented so far also conclude that the introduction of PLs (or the threat of 
introduction) leads to an increase in the retailer’s bargaining power with respect to the sharing of the 
vertical structure profits. 
 
Caprice (2000, Chapter 2) also pointed to the increase in the retailer’s bargaining power. Using a 
two-part tariff model between an upstream manufacturer and a retailer (the double marginalization 
effect vanishes because of the two-part tariff contract: the upstream firm sells at the marginal cost and 
the franchise fee splits the surplus). He showed that the fact that the possibility exists for a retailer to 
sell a PL enables him to make a higher profit. In this model, because the retailer assumes the upstream 
firm will make a take-it or leave-it offer, his profit is defined by his reservation profit. Without a PL, 
the retailer makes zero profit. If the retailer has the opportunity to sell a PL, this creates a reservation 
profit and the upstream manufacturer is consequently obliged to leave a rent for the retailer. The 
amount of this rent is equal to the profit the retailer would make by selling his PL only (i.e. his new 
reservation profit). The retailer thus increases his bargaining power by increasing the profit he can get 
in case of a disagreement with the upstream manufacturer. 
 
Some empirical studies (see below) tend to prove that the PL invasion has resulted in an increase 
in NB prices in some sectors. The models presented so far do not explain such a phenomenon and rely 
on a Mussa-Rosen formatted demand where goods are assumed to be vertically differentiated. It is 
clear that the price reaction of the NB depends on the form of the final demand. Some researchers 
consequently tried to develop models where the increase in NB prices happens after the introduction 
of PLs, at least in some cases. Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2000) analysed the impact of the introduction 
of a PL in a vertical structure where contracts are linear in prices. The form the demand takes, which 
influences the final result, depends on the distinction between two kinds of consumers. Some 
consumers are loyal to the NB, and  as long as the NB product is sold under a certain reservation price 
(identical for all these consumers), they will only buy the NB. The NB demand is thus inelastic. A 
second group of consumers is opportunist. They are characterized by a positive switching cost 
distributed as a function of density. They buy the NB as long as its price is not too high compared to 
the PL (when the PL is sold). In addition, when they buy a good, the reservation utility is not the same 
for all consumers. The demand for the PL is thus price-elastic. As a consequence, when only the NB is 
available, demand for it will increase with a decrease in the NB price. When the relative number of 
loyal consumers varies, the authors show that the introduction of PLs can have different effects on NB 
prices: 
- When the number of loyal consumers is low, the final and wholesale prices of the NB 
decrease. The PL is not introduced by the retailer. The upstream manufacturer consequently 
only needs a limit price strategy to deter the introduction of the PL. This strategy forces him 
to lower his wholesale price in order to leave the retailer enough profit from selling only the 
NB. 
- When the number of loyal consumers increases, this limit price policy becomes too costly. 
The wholesale and final price of the NB increase in response to the actual introduction of the 
PL. The NB manufacturer then only focuses on loyal consumers. As their demand is inelastic, 
wholesale price and final price are equal to their willingness to pay for the NB. 
- Finally, when the number of loyal consumers is very high, introduction of the PL has no 
impact on the NB price. Indeed, before the introduction of the PL, only loyal consumers were 
supplied. The wholesale and retail prices were already equal to the loyal consumers’ 
willingness to pay. 
 
Such results are in contradiction with the previous models presented, but the results rely on a very 
particular demand form from two different groups of consumers. Some (we refer to customers) are 
identical and have infinite switching cost for the PL. Others, on the contrary, have switching costs 
distributed across a specific law of probability, and their willingness to pay varies. The results are 
directly due to this dichotomy. However the Gabrielsen and Sørgard’s study shows that the form of the 
final demand is a key factor in forecasting the impact of the introduction PLs on NB prices. 
The main economic effects due to the actual introduction of a PL are summarized in Table 5. 
The introduction of the PL always increases the retailer’s profit (otherwise he would not sell it) 
and decreases the NB manufacturer’s profit (except in cases where the profit remains constant). 
Regarding profit sharing in the vertical structure, the retailer is able to increase his share. The vertical 
structure surplus increases for two reasons: first, because the double -marginalization effect is less 
severe (as in Mills,1995 and in Bontems et al. , 1999) and second, because of the demand 
discrimination the PL provides (all models). Consumers also benefit from the introduction of PLs for 
the same reasons (weakened double -marginalization and increased variety). 
 
Table 5. Economic effects of the actual introduction of a PL. 
Authors Mills BMR Caprice Gabrielsen and Sørgard 
Variable     A B 
NB wholesale price - - = + = 
Manufacturer’s 
fixed fee 
nr nr - nr nr 
 retail price of NB - - = + = 
manufacturer’s profit on 
NB 
- - - - = 
Retailer’s profit + + + + + 
Vertical structure’s 
profit 
+ + + + + 
Consumers’ 
surplus 
+ + + + + 
BMR: Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999); 
Nr: not relevant in this model; 
A: Proportion of loyal customers neither too low neither too high; 
B: Proportion of loyal consumers high. 
 
Thus, retailers use PLs to increase their bargaining power. It should be stressed that whether or 
not the PL is actually introduced does not modify alter this result. The absence of PLs in certain 
sectors does not necessarily mean that the retailer has not used the threat of developing PL in order to 
increase his profits.  
 
2.2. How do retailers choose the characteristics of private labels? 
Up to now we have considered PLs as new products whose quality is lower than national brands and 
which are purchased at marginal cost by retailers. Under this assumption, PLs appear to be very 
similar to low quality products sold by small brands or brands that are not widely known. However, an 
essential feature of PLs is that their characteristics are fixed by retailers and not by manufacturers. 
Moreover, these decisions are taken strategically to enable the retailer to increase his profits. In the 
models presented above, this choice is driven by trading off price discrimination of final demand and 
willingness to increase the retailer’s bargaining power in the channel. 
For instance, when marginal cost increases with quality, Bontems et al. (1999) showed that the 
quality of the low quality product depends on the market structure and the identity of the player who 
makes the decision.10 The following five situations are classified as a function of an increasing level of 
quality for a low quality product: 
  
1. Upstream multi-product monopoly that chooses quality; 
2. Upstream duopoly where one firm chooses low quality; 
3. Integrated vertical structure; 
4. Upstream high quality monopoly with a competitive fringe producing low quality 
which is chosen by the retailer; 
                                                 
10 In this framework, the quality of branded products is exogenous and not strategically determined.  
5. Upstream duopoly, where the retailer chooses low quality.11 
 
Thus, given the same upstream market structure (first compare cases 1 and 4, and second cases 
2 and 5), it appears that the retailer chooses higher quality for a low quality product than  any upstream 
firm would chose. This is easily understood when considering the trade-off between price 
discrimination and the decrease in wholesale price for branded products. Price discrimination of the 
final demand allows a sufficient degree of product differentiation between both goods to be 
maintained, whereas the biggest decrease in wholesale price is obtained when product differentiation 
is low. Thus, the choice by the retailer of PL characteristics takes into account these two opposing 
effects. Conversely, upstream producers will only consider price discrimination when choosing 
quality. To sum up, the retailer gains by choosing a low quality product that is close to the branded 
product. 
Caprice (2000) has also studied the optimal private label quality when two-part tariffs are 
allowed.12 In section 2.1, we showed that selling private labels enables the retailer to capture a  bigger 
share of the channel’s profit. Thus the possibility of commitment by the upstream producer is crucial 
for the choice of the level of quality of the PL by the retailer. 
If the producer can commit to a contract before the level of quality is chosen by the retailer, 
then the latter chooses the optimal quality level from the channel’s point of view. Indeed, two-part 
tariffs allow the parties to exchange the goods at marginal cost and this gives the right incentives to the 
retailer to maximize joint profit when considering quality choice. 
On the other hand, if quality choice is irreversible or if the upstream producer cannot commit 
to a contract before the retailer’s choice of quality, then the retailer does not maximize joint profit and 
chooses higher quality.13 Indeed in this case, the retailer chooses the level of quality that will 
maximise disagreement payoff, which is obtained when the producer’s product is not sold.  
Note that in this model, for the retailer there is clearly no difference between the two 
situations, because his profit is always equal to his reservation profit, which is the profit he would 
obtain when selling only PLs. However, the upstream producer strictly prefers to commit to a contract 
before the retailer chooses low quality, because then the degree of product differentiation is the 
optimal one from the point of view of the channel’s joint profit.  
According to these models, the retailers would strategically choose higher quality for PLs than 
that that would be chosen by manufacturers. This result seems to be consistent with the marked 
development of ‘me too’ products that are replicates of NB products. In a recent study, Sayman, Hoch 
and Raju (2002) showed that when PLs are targeted towards NB products, this concerns primarily the 
strongest NB products.   
 
Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2000) consider a model where a monopolist retailer bargains 
with several upstream producers. One of the manufacturers offers to sell a leading NB product. The 
retailer has a limited capacity to sell multi-products and can only offer two products on the shelf. The 
choice is whether to distribute either a second NB produced by a second manufacturer or a PL. The 
channel’s profit is divided between producers and the retailer. Each producer earns a given share of 
the incremental profit, that is proportional to his bargaining power. The incremental profit is 
determined by comparing the channel’s profit when the two products are on the shelf and the profit 
when only the competing product is sold.  
Let us assume that three producers, including the PL manufacturer, compete on the market and 
have identical bargaining power. Available goods are differentiated along two attributes, one 
corresponding to vertical differentiation and the other to horizontal differentiation. Thus, branded 
products are assumed to be of higher (exogenous) quality than the PL. Moreover, the horizontal 
                                                 
11 In all these situations, the retailer is assumed to be a monopoly. 
12 With linear pricing, only one instrument (i.e. the quality of the PL) is available both to reduce double 
marginalization and to discriminate final demand as a function of quality. Conversely, two-part tariffs allow the 
franchise fee to be used as a second instrument. 
13 Note that the incomplete nature of the agreements can  justify the impossibility for the producer to commit to a 
contract. 
characteristic of PLs may be set in order to meet consumers’ requirements, which can be of two types. 
A private label designed for market segment 1 will procure less utility for type 2 consumers than 
type 1 consumers. Assuming that the leading brand is designed for type 1 consumers; the problem for 
the retailer is to decide whether to sell a second NB, designed for type 2 consumers, or to sell a PL 
whose horizontal characteristic has to be chosen. The authors showed in this framework that the 
introduction of a PL always diminishes the joint profit of the channel, compared to selling the second 
national brand. But selling a PL also leads to a decrease in the incremental contribution to profits of 
the leading brand. This enables the retailer to capture an increasing share of the total surplus. Overall 
the retailer’s choice is driven by his bargaining power. When his bargaining power is low, the retailer 
strictly prefers to sell a PL and conversely, when his bargaining power is high, a second national brand 
is chosen instead. Indeed, with an increase in his bargaining power, the retailer pays more attention to 
total surplus. The authors also showed that if introduced, the second NB would be designed for type 2 
consumers (in order to lessen competition with the leading brand). Conversely, the PL would be 
introduced on the same segment as the leading brand because its main purpose is to decrease the 
incremental gain of the leading brand. 
Once again, it appears that product positioning depends to a large extent on whether it is 
decided by upstream producers or by retailers. While manufacturers and retailers may both have an 
interest in price discrimination of the final demand, product positioning by retailers through the design 
of PLs allows them to capture a bigger share of the channel’s surplus. As a consequence, this model 
shows that PLs will compete more aggressively with a leading brand than would other NBs. 
One important feature of Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer’s analysis is to explicitly introduce a 
bargaining procedure in vertical contracting in the channel. However, the modelling of final demand 
could be improved in order to test the robustness  of their conclusions. Moreover, the assumption of 
equal bargaining power for all the upstream producers should  be removed in order to better represent 
asymmetric situations. 
 
3. Empirical analysis of the development of private labels  
 
Empirical studies dealing with the impact of the development of PLs can be classified according to the 
type of data used: 
- Analysis based on cross-section data; 
- Analysis based on time-series data. 
 
The first group of empirical analysis (Putsis, 1997; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar, 2000) on the 
impact of the development of PLs used cross-section data relating to many different food products and 
many local markets.14 The authors showed that price reaction functions have positive slopes. A 
decrease in the NB (PL) price is accompanied by a decrease in the PL (NB) price. According to Putsis 
(1997), these price function reactions are asymmetric. The PL price would react more to a variation in 
NB price than the NB price to a change in PL price. However, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar (2000) did 
not confirm these results on asymmetric price reaction functions.  
Putsis’s results suggest that a larger PL market share is correlated with a decrease in the NB 
price and an increase in the PL price. This negative relation between the PL market share and the 
difference in price between the NB and the PL is rather counter-intuitive. However, if the competition 
between the NB and the PL is strongly influenced by the quality of both goods, this could be the result 
of the role of this unobserved characteristic (Mills, 1995).15 A larger PL market share would result 
                                                 
14 For example, Putsis (1997) analysed competition between PLs and NBs over 135 food products sold in 59 
geographical areas in 1991 and 1992. Cotteril, Putsis and Dhar (2000) used data from 125 food products in 54 
geographical areas.  
15 According to Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar (2000), these results could originate in a inappropriate econometric 
treatment that does not deal with the simultaneity of demand and competitive interactions between agents in the 
market. Using the same kind of data and dealing with the problem of simultaneity, they found a positive link 
between the PL market share and the difference in price between the NB and the PL. 
from a higher level of PL quality (compared with NB quality). In Table 6, we show the impact of an 
increase in PL quality on price and surpluses according to the two models previously described.  
When PL quality increases, the NB price decreases because of the decrease in differentiation 
between the two products. Moreover the PL price increases in response to the increase in consumer 
utility (in the vertical differentiation model, the utility of every consumer increases with the quality of 
product).  Finally, the NB market share decreases because the decrease in NB price does not 
compensate for the negative impact on demand for an increase in PL quality. Thus, in a cross-section 
analysis, the PL market share is larger when the difference between NB and PL prices is smaller, 
because a limited difference in price is associated with a small difference in quality between the NB 
and PL products.  
Moreover, according to Mills and ‘BMR’ models, the retailer’s margin for PL is greater than 
the margin for NB. This prediction is in accordance with empirical facts.  
 
Table 6: Impact of an increase in PL quality  
 Mills BMR 
  A B 
Wholesale price of NB - - - 
Retail price of NB - - - 
Market share of NB (%) - - - 
Retail price of PL + + + 
Market share of PL(%) + + + 
Average PL NB price + + + 
NB producer’s profit - - - 
Retailer’s profit + + then - + 
Vertical structure profit + + then - + 
Consumers’ surplus + + then - + 
A: low level of heterogeneity between consumers; 
B: high level of heterogeneity between consumers. 
 
A second group of empirical analyses (Ward, Shimshack, Perloff and Harris, 2002; Gabrielsen, 
Steen and Sørgard, 2002) used time-series data, thus eliminating the effects of structure. Ward et al. 
studied the impact of the development of PL in the US. They used monthly data on prices, market 
shares, and advertising expenses for 34 product categories. For each category, they analysed how NBs 
react to the development of PLs. They showed that an increase in the PL market share is accompanied 
by: 
- An increase in the price of NBs (or no impact); 
- A decrease in the price of PLs (or no impact); 
- A negative impact or no impact on average prices; 
- A decrease in advertising activity for NBs. 
 
Gabrielsen, Steen and Sørgard (2002) studied the impact of the introduction of PLs in Norway. 
They used weekly data on the prices and market shares of 83 products. For each product, they studied 
changes in NB prices over time and distinguished the period before the entry of PLs from the period 
after  entry.16 When the impact of the introduction of PLs is significant (17 cases and 83 products) the 
impact is positive (15 cases). Thus, the introduction of PL induces an increase in NB prices. The 
increase in NB prices is larger when the PL market share is small. Finally their results suggest that the 
increase in NB prices is larger for leading and nationally distributed brands.  
 
Finally, some empirical analyses deal with the interactions between manufacturers and retailers 
and the measurement of profit-sharing in vertical structures. Thus Kadialy, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 
(2000) studied the share of profits between manufacturers and retailers on fruit juice and tuna markets 
                                                 
16 They estimate a price equation for NB (AR(1) model) which includes a dummy variable indicating if a PL 
product is present or not. The coefficient of this variable indicates the impact of the existence of PL.  
in the US. They used a model based on conjectural variations. According to their results, 
manufacturers who produce high quality products (or perceived as such by consumers) gain a larger 
share of the profit of their vertical structure than other manufacturers. However, these estimates are 
based on wholesale and retail prices and do not take fixed fees into account. Chintagunta, Bonfrer and 
Song (2002), using data on sales from different stores of a large supermarket chain, studied the impact 
of the introduction of PLs in the breakfast oats market. They showed that the introduction of PLs 
generates a decrease in the price of the leading NB, a decrease in promotion activities of the NB and 
no change in the margin the retailer earns on the NB.  
 
4. Less frequently analysed topics 
 
We have just shown that empirical findings do not systematically support the theoretical mechanisms 
involved in the previous models. An inadequate treatment of product quality in the analysis could 
explain some gaps. The divergences could also originate in other mechanisms that were not integrated 
in the previous models. We discuss some of these in the following section.  
4.1. Private labels, capacity constraints and competition between retailers 
. 
According to Allain and Flochel (2000) restricting the supply of shelf space (as done by the Raffarin 
law in France) could slow down the development of PLs. This result is obtained with a model similar 
to the one developed by Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999). In such a framework, restricting the 
availability of shelf space favours NBs to the detriment of PLs because absolute margins at the retail 
level are larger on NBs than PLs. However, Allain and Flochel (2000) also showed that the restriction 
of shelf space is detrimental to upstream producers because it induces an overall decrease in the 
quantity of NBs sold by the retailer (this is due to the increase in price). The latter result is true only if 
the downstream structure does not change. With free-entry at the retail level, restriction of shelf space 
per retailer is not incompatible with an increase in the profit of upstream firms. Thus, the negative 
impact on profits of restrictions on shelf space is now lower due to the entry of new retailers. The 
positive impact on profit of a price increase now outweighs the negative impact of the decrease in 
sales.  
Generally, studies on the development of PLs consider a downstream monopoly. This allows 
the analysis to focus on strategic interactions within a vertical structure (i.e. between retailers and 
producers). However, such a framework neglects interactions between retailers. Caprice (2000) 
investigated the strategic choice of a producer with respect to two retailers who are considering 
developing their own PL. He showed that for a given quality gap between a NB and a PL, the strategic 
choice of the upstream producer depends on the difference in production costs between the NB and the 
PL. When the upstream producer has only a small cost advantage (w.r.t. the producer of PL) then the 
NB is not sold by retailers. When the cost advantage increases, then it is better for the NB producer to 
offer his product to only one retailer. Finally, if the cost advantage is big enough, the producer sells his 
products to both retailers. The optimal choice of the upstream producer results from a trade-off 
between the size of his share of the cake (the share is bigger when his product is distributed by the two 
retailers) and the size of the cake to share (competition between retailers decrease the overall 
surplus).17 
4.2. Can the Private Labels be profitable to National Brand manufacturers? 
 
As the PLs compete directly with the NB products, a priori, NB manufacturers loose profits when a 
retailer introduces a new PL. However this issue appears to be more complicated that it seems at first 
                                                 
17 The framework of the analysis assumes two-part tariffs. Thus an increase in competition between retailers 
generates a decrease in the surplus of the industry since there is no double marginalization (as shown previously, 
with linear pricing the decrease in double marginalization generates an increase in the surplus of the industry). 
sight. Private labels do indeed compete with NBs on the product market, but the question of PL 
production and its associated profits remains. From this point of view, NB manufacturers may find it 
profitable to manufacture the PL for the retailer. 
 
One argument given by the leading NB manufacturers about producing PLs is that the 
production of such a good allows them to use excess production capacity. In addition, for these 
volumes, they do not have to incur the level of marketing and product development costs usually 
associated with branded products, as suggested by Bell et al. (1997). NB manufacturers will hence 
produce a good that will compete with their own, but if they refuse to produce it, others will do so. 
The extra revenues from the production of the PL will then go to other firms, whoever these may be: 
big competing manufacturers or small companies specialized in PLs production. 
This reasoning nevertheless has the following caveat: it implicitly assumes that firms that may 
be chosen to manufacture the PL are able to make a product whose characteristics are close to those of 
the NB. If this is not the case, a leading NB manufacturer may see no advantage in producing the PL 
because there is no credible alternative for the retailer to find a “serious” competitor.18 Coca-Cola falls 
into this category: due to its huge investments in advertising, its brand is so well known that no 
competing PL is a threat in the short term, even if some of the existing private label colas are 
recognized as being excellent products according to consumers’ blind tests. Consequently, Coca-Cola 
does not manufacture PLs.  Similarly, on the fresh dairy products market, Nestlé and Danone, which 
possess well known brands across Europe, do not produce PLs at a large scale.  
 
It should be acknowledged these firms are an exception and that most major food producers do 
produce private labels. Indeed, when a close PL alternative to the NB exists, the manufacturer may 
often find profitable to produce its own competing good. However, the decision about who will 
produce the PL belongs to the retailer.  
 
When taking the decision about who is going to produce his PL, the retailer trades-off between 
gains in efficiency and shares in rents. On the one hand, if the manufacturer of the NB also 
manufactures the PL, he may pay some costs such as packaging costs, or he may help the retailer in 
the definition of the PL manufacturing process and characteristics.19 This will allow the NB 
manufacturer to offer a good at a lower cost than an isolated firm from the competitive fringe could. 
On the other hand, by having his PL produced by the manufacturer of the equivalent NB, the retailer 
entrusts both the goods and his profits to the same agent, i.e. the manufacturer of the NB. This will 
have some implications for the NB tariff proposed by the upstream manufacturer. 
 
As shown in Bergès-Sennou (2002), when the retailer’s bargaining power is low, he will 
prefer to entrust the production of his PL to an independent firm, because if the retailer entrusts his PL 
to the NB manufacturer, he has also to share the profits from the PL with the NB manufacturer. But if 
the retailer’s bargaining power is limited, then he will get less of the profit from the PL in the 
negotiation than he would if the PL were produced by an independent firm. The second result is that 
the higher consumer loyalty to the NB, the more likely the PL is to be entrusted to the NB 
manufacturer. High consumer loyalty to the NB means that the PL is really not a credible alternative to 
the NB. In this case the retailer finds it more profitable to only benefit from the cost-advantage of the 
NB manufacturer. The model also predicts that the merger of buying units belonging to different 
retailers favours isolated firms for PL production. 
 
                                                 
18 The problem to the PL manufacturer who wants to produce a “me-too” may be either to overcome a technical 
gap or to build a reputation as high as the one developed by the leading brand. In our opinion, the second 
problem is more frequently observed in the food sector because the production technologies are rather standard 
and the R&D effort is usually low. 
19 See Le Borgne (1996): ‘‘La marque de distributeur: l’étude des relations fournisseur-distributeur’’, Mémoire 
de DESS en Droit des Affaires, Université de Bourgogne, 53 pages. 
4.3 The Diversity of Private Labels 
 
Talking about private label as a single good can be misleading in the sense that generally, 
private label encompasses a full quality range of products. For a given good, private label applies to 
low-price products, me-too products and high-quality products. In our opinion, low-price products are 
now maintained by retailers to compete with “hard-discounters”, that is retailers which mainly offer 
PLs sold at very low prices (in Europe, Aldi is the leading hard-discounter). The issue is to “attract” or 
to keep consumers with low willingness to pay. The second kind of products are copies of national 
brands (for example, with packaging close to the one of the leading brand) and often sold at a lower 
price. These PLs help in obtaining price concessions from national brand manufacturers as explained 
in section 2. Indeed, they represent a good alternative for consumers to the leading brand product and 
thus compete directly with targeted national brands (see Meza and Sudhir, 2003). At last, more 
recently, some retailers develop a new kind of high-quality private label in order to increase consumer 
loyalty or to attract new consumers. Sometimes, this leads retailers to innovate and to create new 
categories of products that national brand manufacturers have not investigated before. For instance, 
this is the case of chilled-ready-eat-meals.21 In our opinion, this recent trend mainly proceeds from the 
desire of retailers to soften price competition between them by increasing their differentiation.  
It is worth noting that a weakness of the existing literature is that it only considers private 
label as a single good competing with a branded product, implicitly focusing on the me-too products. 
4.4 Impact on farmers 
 
Should the development of PL have an impact on the farm? This question is not addressed in the 
reviewed literature. Let us distinguish between processed products and fresh products.  
With respect to processed products the impact is indirect and the question becomes: does the 
development of PL have an impact on final demand? If the increasing role of PL is essentially a story 
of substitution among brands, then the farm sector has not a lot to gain from their development. 
Conversely, if PL development is accompanied by an increase in the total market, then the derived 
demand by the food industry to agricultural products will increase. Using results from Ward et al. 
(2002), who show that the impact of PL development on prices is either zero or slightly negative, one 
can conclude that the expansion effect of PL development is likely to be small. Thus, the impact on the 
farm sector is likely to be marginal. 
With respect to fresh products, the question is different. In these sectors, at least in European 
countries, national brands do not exist.22 At present, retailers are developing their private labels 
(generally with the same name for all fruits and vegetables) in this sector. Rather than a mean to 
improve their bargaining power with the upstream level (as the upstream level is atomized in this 
sector, they already have a strong bargaining power), this is a way to better discriminate among 
consumers.23 This strategy could lead to an increase in the volume and the value of the sales. If this is 
the case, then the impact on the farm sector should be positive. It is also noteworthy to mention that 
these PLs are developed using contracts with farmers. These contracts are based on requirements 
which are generally more demanding than the ones developed by the main cooperatives or firms 
involved in fresh products trade. It means that the retailers are going to develop their PL on a basis of 
rather high standard of quality. In particular retailers are often concerned with the environmental and 
health contents of their products.24 This could increase the volume of sales and hence could represent a 
positive opportunity for the farm sector.  
                                                 
 
21 We thank the referee for mentioning this example. 
22 Some brands exist but they are mainly unknown to the final consumer. It is mainly used to facilitate exchange 
between suppliers and retailers. Thus they do not play the same role. 
23 This is also a way for a retailer to differentiate himself from his competitors. 
24 For example, they limit the use of pesticide. 
 5. Concluding remarks  
 
Most of the models agree on the positive impact on welfare of the development of PLs in the short 
term. In these models, PLs are frequently considered as additional goods that allow the retailer to 
increase his profit to the detriment of the upstream producer, either by decreasing the wholesale price 
or by capturing a larger share of the surplus of the industry. In these models, consumers benefit from 
the increase in the number of goods available and from the positive impact of the reduction in double 
marginalization.25 In practice in the shop, a PL generally replaces another product, for example a 
regional brand. In this case the positive impact linked to the increase in the number of goods available 
for the consumer in a shop disappears. However we have shown that the strategic choice of product 
quality by a retailer or a producer is not identical. For a given quality of the NB, the retailer designs a 
less differentiated good than an upstream producer would. Therefore the consumer will benefit from 
an increase in competition between the two products but could be penalised by the lower degree of 
differentiation between products. Thus, in a more realistic framework, it is not certain that the 
introduction and development of PLs lead to an increase in consumer surplus and to an increase in 
welfare. For example, Caprice (2000), using a framework of non-linear pricing, showed that when the 
choice of characteristics of the PL is strongly irreversible, the introduction of PL decreases welfare as 
compared to a case where the characteristics are chosen by the integrated vertical structure.  
In a longer term analysis, even if no specific work has been done on this topic, the impact of 
PL could well be less positive. The argument is the following: the development of PLs leads to a 
different share of profits within vertical structures. A decrease in the profits of the upstream producers 
could lead to less innovation and thus reduce the variety of goods available to consumers. This 
mechanism is reinforced by the strategy of retailers who develop ‘me-too’ products. This strategy is 
nothing else than free-riding on research and development of new products. Such a free-riding will 
discourage the efforts devoted to the development of new products in the long term. Moreover, the 
development of PLs can modify competition between retailers in the long term. For example, PLs 
enable greater differentiation between retailers and thus lower price competition among retailers which 
is detrimental to welfare (for a discussion on long-term effects, see Dobson, 1998). 
The economics of private labels needs to be more elaborated as a lot of questions remain to be 
answered. From a conceptual point of view, the consequences on inter-brand competition of the dual 
role of distributors who both carry the competing NB and their own PL are not fully explored. 
Furthermore, the strategic design of characteristics of the PL by the retailer has not been sufficiently 
addressed in the literature. More generally, the implications for competition policy of the PL 
development are not explored. In particular, this questions the way competition policy has to deal with 
concentration in the retail sector. 
A second group of issues is related to the existence of different PLs and to the understanding 
of their effects. As explained before, while retailers develop a range of PLs, economic models have 
not accounted for as they frequently focus on a generic PL and its impact on the vertical chain.  
A better understanding of these two groups of issues will certainly need to take into account 
the interactions between retailers. Until now, the literature generally considers a downstream 
monopoly. This assumption needs to be relaxed to address competition policy issue as well as 
heterogeneity in PLs.  
A third group of questions is related to the long term implications of PLs invasion on 
innovation and product development. As explained before, on the one hand some PLs are clearly free 
riding on R&D effort from NB producers. But, on the other hand, as retailers have better information 
on the demand side of the market, they can participate to the R&D effort (for example by creating new 
products as it is sometimes observed).  
On the empirical part of the agenda, it is also needed to better identify the specific interaction 
between PLs and NBs. At least two directions may be explored. The first one, following recent papers 
by Meza & Sudhir (2003) for example, is to distinguish the impact of PLs on the different NBs. The 
                                                 
25 This latter effect is only relevant in a framework of linear pricing.  
second one is to distinguish between the various kinds of  PLs. To sum up, the empirical analysis now 
needs to be much more precise and to disaggregate among PLs and among NBs. 
 
More generally, the analysis of the vertical relationships between producers and retailers needs to 
be more deeply investigated, in particular the analysis of the retailer power. Only few papers 
addressed this issue as most studies consider a perfectly competitive retail sector. There are some 
recent and interesting contributions in the Industrial Organization literature (e.g. Berto Villas-Boas, 
2003) as well as in the marketing literature (e.g. Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003). However, it seems that 
the empirical models have not yet used all the implications of IO models. Finally, the lack of data on 
wholesale prices as well as fixed fees (slotting allowances, …) and more generally on contracts 
between producers and retailers is a strong limit to the development of empirical work in this field. It 
certainly explains why until now only few empirical works have been undergone on producer-retailer 
relations although this is certainly a central issue in the analysis of competition in many industries. 
 
                                                 
26 In a study on strategic interactions between manufacturers and retailers, Berto Villas-Boas (2003) rejects the 
assumption of linear pricing. 
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